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ERlSA and State Regulation of Health Care
Introduction
In 1974, the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act (ERISA), 88

Stat. 829, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §I001 et. seq., was passed by Congress and
signed into law. The legislation was formed from trust law and enacted for the
sole purpose of ensuring proper management of employee pension plans. Its aim
was not to overlay principles of fiduciary duties for pension plans on managed
health care. Indeed, the managed health care environment as we know it today,
and in which ERlSA is being implemented, did not exist in 1974. Today's
employee benefit plans intertwine the functions of providing pensions and
financing health care in a restrictive and chaotic environment. As a result, the
original scope of ERlSA has extended beyond ensuring the integrity of corporate
pension funds to the regulation of local health care delivery at the federal level.
This paper will discuss the federal-state tension concerning the regulation
of health care and the impact of ERlSA on this relationship. Part I discusses the
historical basis for state regulation of health care. Part II is a basic primer on
ERlSA including a review of its legislative history. Part Ill reviews the Supreme
Court's treatment of preemption. Part IV discusses some of the current state
health regulatory efforts with ERISA, in the background, as the omnipresent
trump card.

Part V concludes asserting that states are the logical site for

regulation of health care and that a federal-state partnership is the best
environment in which to address ERlSA complexities.

ERISA and State Regulation of Health Care
I. State Requlation Of Health Care: In the Beainning
Historically, the primary responsibility for regulating health care fell within
the domain of the states. In one of the earliest cases to address this, the
Supreme Court recognized that it was a "solemn duty of a state, to advance the
safety, happiness and prosperity of its people, and to provide for its general
welfare...."' Local and state ordinances related to health and safety were not
traditionally invalidated under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution and the
presumption was that historic police powers of the States were not to be
overruled by Federal legislation unless it was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress.

The ability of states to regulate health care, or at least the health

insurance sector, was given further weight with the passage of the McCarranFerguson Act, 15 U.S.C.

5 1011 et. seq. in 1945.

Congress' primary concern in passing the McCarran-Ferguson Act was to
ensure that states would continue to have the ability to tax and regulate
insurance. The McCarran-Ferguson Act provides that: "The business of
insurance and every person engaged therein, shall be subject to the laws of the
several states which relate to the regulation or taxation of such bu~iness."~
Cases interpreting the scope of the McCarran-Ferguson Act have identified three
criteria to be used in determining if a particular practice falls within the Act's
"business of insurance" language:
1. Whether the practice has the effect of transferring or
spreading a policyholder's risk;
2. Whether the practice is an integral part of the policy
relationship between the insurer and the insured; and
3. Whether the practice is limited to entities within the
insurance i n d ~ s t r y . ~
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Before ascertaining if the McCarran-Ferguson factors are satisfied, the
simpler question of whether the state law in question "fits a common-sense
understanding of insurance regulation" is asked.5 The factors are then
"considerations to be weighed in determining whether a state law regulates
insurance."=
Until the passage of ERISA, states retained the primary responsibility for
regulating health insurance, as well as ensuring health access for its citizens.
With the passage of the ERISA, this authority has diminished and is oflen open
to differing interpretations by the courts. Nowhere did the drafters of ERISA
mention, let alone foresee, the impact of the legislation on the structure and
regulation of health care. The basic effects of ERISA allow employment-related
insurance to subvert state regulation and impede state efforts to increase access
to health care or implement meaningful health care reform.'

II. A throuqh Z on ERISA: A Basic Primer

Originally passed to end the raiding of employee benefit plans by insolvent
companies and dishonest corporate executives, the actual impact of ERISA has
broadened beyond the wildest dreams (or nightmares) of Congress. The sponsor
of ERISA, Senator Jacob Javitz, said the purpose of the legislation was "to
maintain the voluntary growth of private pension and employee benefit plans
while at the same time making needed structural reforms in such areas as
vesting, funding, termination, etc. so as to safeguard workers against loss of their
earned or anticipated benefits...."8 Senator Williams, a sponsor of the Senate
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version of ERISA said, in support of the legislation, that if a business ended and
there were insufficient funds to meet the vested claims of the participants,
employees had no recourse. Fresh in the minds of the drafters of ERISA was the

1963 shutdown of a Studebaker plant in South Bend, Indiana resulting in over
4,500 workers losing 85 percent of their vested benefits because the plan had

insufficient assets to pay its liabilities. Additionally, the Departments of Labor and
Treasury reported 19,000 workers losing vested benefits in 1963 because of the
termination of insufficiently funded plans.g
ERISA's narrow and intended focus on pension benefit plans, rather than
permeating states' regulation of health care, is supported by its legislative history
and by other Congressional activity in the early 1970s. The same Congress that
enacted ERISA, subsequently passed the National Health Planning and
Resources Development A d of 1974 (NHPRDA)" which "sought to encourage
and help fund state responses to growing health care costs and the widely
diverging availability of health care

service^."^'

This legislation envisioned health

planning agencies coordinating the development of state based health services
Even more recent federal legislation concerning health care, such
and po~icy.'~
as Medicaid managed care, supports the premise that Congress envisions states
as "laboratories of change" with respect to health care policy and s e r ~ i c e s . ' ~
The aim of Congress in enacting ERISA in 1974 was two-fold: first,

develop a uniform set of rules and regulations that benefit plans would be bound

by without consideration as to what state the plan may be operating in; and
second, minimize the administrative and financial burdens to set up and maintain
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employee benefit plans such that employers would be more apt to develop such
plans. To that end, Congress established extensive reporting, disclosure and
fiduciary duty requirements to ensure that poor management by the plan
administrator would not undermine employee benefit plans.'4 ERlSA defines its
focus, the employee benefit plan, as:
"[Alny plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is
hereafter established by an employer or by an employer
organization, or by both, to the extent that such plan, fund, or
program was established or is maintained for the purpose of
providing for its participants... (A) medical, surgical, or hospital
care or benefits, or benefils in the event o f sickness, accident,
disability, death or unem loyment, or vacation benefits....or
prepaid legal services.. . .n l

9

The above mention of health care benefits is one of its few references in
the entire ERlSA legislation thus lending further support that health care
regulation was not its primary intended focus.

However, Congress did state

clearly in the language of the ERlSA that state laws relating to employee benefit
plans should be invalidated, except for state insurance regulation. This
nullification creates a legislative void or an ERlSA vacuum. States cannot
regulate concerning the structure or administration of ERlSA employee benefit
plans and Congress did not offer any guidance, other than relying on disclosure
requirements and fiduciary obligations, for employee benefit plans.16 An early
Supreme Court case in the ERlSA lifecycle, Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v.
Massachusetts, held that regulation of the substantive terms of insurance
contracts falls squarely within the domain of state insurance as defined by
McCarran-Ferguson and thus is regulated by the states." States also regulate
some managed care organizations to the extent that the regulation is
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characterized as the business of ins~rance.'~
This position has been undermined
somewhat by the pervasive, and often still evolving practice of preemption of
state laws under ERISA.
The "crowning achieve men^''^ of ERISA is its broad preemption provision
set forth in 3514 (a). The provision explicitly says that ERISA "shall supersede
any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereaffer relate to any
employee benefit plan.....20 The legislation is to "preempt the field" of employee
benefit and pension plans thereby "eliminating the threat of conflicting or
inconsistent State and local regu~ation."~'This preemption clause, primarily
relates to, overrules any state law that mandates the structure or the
administration of an employee benefit plan. This is augmented by the implicit
preemption contained in §502(a).'~This provision allows federal court jurisdiction
over claims relevant to ERISA plans basically negating state law claims. The
Supreme Court has interpreted this section to imply that Congress intended to
preempt the entire field of employee benefits allowing claims asserted in state
court to be removed to federal court. Sec. 502 (a) provides that ERISA will be the
"exclusive remedy" for beneficiaries therefore State law claims such as contract
breach or tort are instead brought in federal court and recharecterized as claims
for denial of benefits or breach of fiduciary duty. Removal to federal court by the
defendant is permitted under the "complete preemption" or "superpreemption"
exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule.=
The well-pleaded complaint rule normally permits removal to federal court
of only those claims specifically raised in the plaintiffs complaint. Under §502 (a),
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this rule is essentially ignored and state law claims are recharecterized as federal
claims; the claims are then removed to federal court under Congress' power to
completely occupy the field related to employee benefits. Thus complete
preemption operates as an enhanced version of federal j~risdiction.'~
The only counterbalance to this broad reach is § 514(b)(2)(A), the savings
clause, which returns to the states the regulation of insurance. It reads,
"...nothing in this title shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from
any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or sec~rifies."~~
The
savings clause, using the same language of the McCarran-Ferguson Act,

- any

law of any state which regulates insurance -, ensures that regulation of insurance
is left to the states.

'' Under Metropolitan Life, a law regulating insurance must

not just have an impact on the insurance but must be directed towards that
industry thus state laws of general applicability, such as tort, bad faith, and
breach of contract, are thwarted by ERISA preemption. A companion to the
savings clause, 9514 (d), states that "nothing in ERISA shall be ~ 0 n s t ~ etod
alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair, or supercede any law of the United
~tates."'~
Courts have used this section to support that the McCarran-Ferguson
Act is not superceded by ERISA."~
The reach of the savings clause is limited by §514(b)(2)(B), the deemer
clause, which says "Neither an employee benefit plan ... nor any trust
established under such a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company or
other insurer, ... to be engaged in the business of insurance or banking for
purposes of any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies,

ERISA and State Regulation of Health Care
insurance confracfs...."29 The deemer clause does not allow states to regard
employee benefit plans, either insured plans or self funded plans, as insurance
so these plans are preempted by ERISA precluding state regulation.30Unlike a
fully insured plan, a self-funded plan does not purchase policies from insurance
companies to satisfy its obligations to its emp~oyees;~'
rather, the plan pays the
actual health care costs incurred by employees. However, self-funded plans
often purchase 'stop-loss' insurance to limit liability and negative financial impact
to the business. Despite purchasing the stop-loss insurance, self-funded plans
generally do not fall under the regulation of insurance by states. The distinction is
that even though self-funded plans use stop-loss insurance coverage to minimize
loss, employees in such plans still face risk of not being able to recover claims
from a stop-loss insurer in the event that the employer becomes inso~vent.~'
The broad preemption and impact on state laws that has resulted was not
in the initial design of ERISA. In the original drafts of the legislation, only state
laws, which dealt with the same subjects specifically regulated by ERISA, were
preempted. The preemption clause was significantly broadened at the last minute
to preempt all state laws that relate to benefit plans out of a concern that state
professional organizations would hinder the development of employee benefit
programs such as prepaid legal services. There is little to suggest that the
preemption clause was broadened out of a concern about state regulation of
health care beyond a general concern about conflicting state laws.33 Prior to
ERISA's passage, the reconciliation of the Senate and House versions of the
legislation in the Conference Committee resulted in an expanded preemption
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clause. This change gave significant importance to the savings clause; however,
the savings clause did not undergo any changes in the Conference Committee to
compensate for the enlargement of the preemption clause. There were no
comments on the floor of either chamber concerning the savings clause and
changes to the preemption clause were not disclosed until the Committee's
report was filed in Congress. This occurred only ten days before final action was
to taken on ERISA. Likewise, there is little to support that §514 (d), the
companion clause to the savings clause, was to have significance importance
when interpreting ERISA.~~
Courts struggle with how to interpret and apply the preemption, savings,
514 (a) has received
and deemer clauses. The explicit preemption clause in ?j
the most scrutiny by the Supreme Court, as it has been the topic of nearly two
dozen opinion^.^' Justice Stevens noted that a LEXlS search produced 2800
citations to ERISA preemption in lower federal courts.36 Justice Souter
commented that the "relate to" provision in §514(a) if "taken to the furthest stretch
of its indeterminacy, then for all practical purposes preemption would never run
its course for 'really, universally, relations stop nowhere."'37 Even Justice Scalia
said that the Supreme Court should admit that their "first take on this [ERISA]
statute was wrong ...." He urged the court to return to applying principles of
ordinary field preemption which would presume that ERISA applies to the field of
employee benefits plans rather than allowing the "relate to" language in the
preemption provision of §514 (a) set forth a test for preemption. He even goes as
far to say that the "relates to" provis~on,so central to the Court's interpretation of
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ERISA, would become irrelevant noting, "as many a curbstone philosopher has
observed, everything is related to everything else."38
The above sentiments reflect the Court's frustration with ERISA. It is not
clear, however, how this frustration or the state-federal tension will be resolved.
Currently, there is hesitancy by the Court to allow federal legislation to reach
States via the Commerce clause. On the other hand, the ever-changing
legislative political landscape ensures that the struggle between states' rights
and federal legislation will continue. Future decisions by the Supreme Court may
determine the reach of ERISA.

Ill ERISA and the Supreme Court: A Frequent Flyer
State and federal governments can both legislate or have concurrent
jurisdiction under the United States Constitution. The Supremacy Clause,
Commerce Clause and Congressional powers in Article I are then used to
mediate concurrent jurisdi~tion.~~
The Dormant Commerce clause, always lurking
in the shadows, invalidates state laws which burden interstate commerce in
areas where Congress has not yet legislated. Using its powers to support a
policy of national unity, national common market, and federal supremacy,
Congress can authorize legislation that can trump state legislation.
In addition to the above constitutional preemption, Congress may, through
legislative preemption, assert that they will occupy the field that pertains to the
legislation and invalidate any conflicting state laws in the process. ERISA is
legislative preemption; Congress expressly said in §514 (a) that ERISA "shaN
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supercede any and all state laws in so far as they....relate to any employee
benefit plan."" Federal preemption of the whole field of employee benefits will be
assumed when "the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be
assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject."" To this
end, courts historically have engaged in a textual analysis of ERISA scrutinizing
its language and structure to determine to what extent Congress meant to
invalidate state law pertaining to the field of employee benefit plans. Until
recently, courts used this textual analysis or "plain meaning" approach to
sanction the broad preemption reach of E R I S A . ~
In one of the first Supreme Court cases interpreting the "relate to'
provision of §514 (a), the Court said the ERISA is a "comprehensive statute"
intending to occupy the entire field of employee benefit plans and the preemption
provision should be interpreted broadly.44Thus, ERISA overruled any state law
that related to an employee benefit plan even if such law was not directed at
these plans. The only limit that the Court placed on the preemption provision was
that it would not apply if the state law relation to the employee benefit plan is "too
tenuous, remote, or peripheral.""
This literal interpretation of "relate to' was the tool used by the Supreme
Court from the 1980s through the mid-1990s expanding preemption of state laws
which either had a "reference to" or a "connection with" employee benefit plans.
During this time, the Court found preemption of a variety of state laws under
§514 (a) including:

+

New York laws that prohibited employment discrimination on the

basis of pregnancy and would have required ERISA plans to
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provide a certain level of disability benefits thus mandating the
structure of a benefit plan. One of the laws was saved under §514
(b)(2)(A) or savings clause. 46

+

A Massachusetts law requiring mental health benefits for every
health insurance policy for Massachusetts's residents. Although the
Court found the law was preempted under ERISA, it ultimately
found that it was "saved from preemption under §514 (b)(2)(~)."

+

A Pennsylvania law which prohibited employee benefit plans from
invoking subrogation rights concerning monetary recovery in tort
actions. The Court found the language in the Pennsylvania law
referring to "any program, group, contract, or other arrangement or
the payment of benefits" was sufficient reference to an employee
benefit plan to warrant exemption under 5514 (a). The Court held
that the Pennsylvania law was saved from preemption under 514
(b) (2)

+

Mississippi state common law claims of breach of good faith and
fair dealing for improper claims processing and failure to pay
benefits under an insurance policy thus "related to" employee
benefit plans were preempted by ERISA. The Court also said such
state law claims were laws of general applicability not directed
toward the insurance industry and as such were not saved under
§514 (b) (2) (a).49

+

A District of Columbia law, which mandated that employers who
offer health insurance to provide equivalent benefits for, injured
employees eligible for workers' compensation. As the state statute
referred to 'health insurance', the Court found that this was enough
of a reference to employee benefit plans, that ERISA preemption
was warranted.50, 51

Justice Steven's dissents in two cases in the early 1990's may have
signaled that the tide was turning in the Court with respect to broad ERISA
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preemption of state laws. First, in FMC Corp. v. Holliday 111 S. Ct. 403, 412
(1990), Justice Stevens argued that "the Court has endorsed an unnecessarily
broad reading of the words 'relate to

...I

as they are used in the basic preemption

clause of 9514 (a)....l am persuaded that Congress did not intend this clause to
cut nearly so broad a swath in the field of state laws as the Court's expansive
construction will create." Then, in District of Columbia v. The Greater Washington
Board of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 135 (1992), the Justice said, "it is time to take a
fresh look at ERlSA preemption."
In the mid-1990s, following Justice Steven's premonitions, the Court
decided a trilogy of cases narrowing the Court's interpretation of ERlSA
preemption." The earliest and most significant of these three cases, New York
State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514
U.S. 645 (1995), marks the point at which the Court turned away from a strict
literal interpretation of the ERlSA statute and looked to congressional intent. In
Travelers, the Court settled the lower courts' question of whether state statutes,
aimed at imposing hospital surcharges designed to fund uncompensated health
care, were preempted by ERlSA as an interference with the administration of
employee benefit plans. Judge Souter, delivering the opinion for a unanimous
court, systematically approached preemption noting at the outset that:
"phe Court] has never assumed lightly that Congress has
derogated state regulation [of health care], but instead have
addressed claims of pre-ernption with the starting presumption
that Congress does not intend to supplant state law.... We
have worked on the assumption that the historic police powers
of the States were not to be superceded by the Federal Act
unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of ~ o n g r e s s . " ~ ~
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Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas, both strict textualists, signed onto the
unanimous opinion of the Court agreeing with:
"Since preemption claims turns on Congress's intent, we begin
as we do in any exercise of statutory construction with the text
of the provision in question, and move on, as need be, to the
structure and the purpose of the Act in which it occurs...The
governing text of ERlSA is clearly expansive... if "relate to" were
carried to the furthest stretch of its indeterminacy, then for all
practical purposes, preemption would never run its course... "54
The Court continued saying if state laws which had an "indirect economic
influence" on ERlSA plans were preempted, then the limiting language of §514
(a) (insofar as they...relate); the decision in Shaw holding that state law
provisions relate to an ERlSA plan if they have a "connection with" the plan and
not just a "tenuous, remote, or peripheral" connection, the National Health
Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974 with its devolution of health
planning to the states, and even Medicare regulation would all be irrelevant and
trumped by broad ERlSA preemption.55
Following Travelers, the new test used to ascertain preemption is not
whether the state law 'relates to" the employee benefit plan, but whether those
state laws either indirectly of directly require plan administrators to adopt a
minimum level of benefits, has an effect on the administration of the plan, or
precludes the uniform administration of benefit plans.56 For the purposes of
preemption and state law, when the challenge is to the procedure, administration
or structure of an employee benefit plan, ERlSA preemption is triggered,
Although ERlSA is still the Goliath to the states' David, Travelers marked
an end to ever-burgeoning ERlSA preemption of state laws concerning health
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care. For example, twenty-two states have enacted laws to impose taxes on
health care providers and seventeen states have created high-risk insurance
pools by imposing taxes on commercial health insurance. Under traditional
analysis of ERISA, these laws risked preemption and invalidation. Traveler's
ratcheting down of ERISA preemption gives states more leverage and a "legally
viable tool" for health care regulation than previously available."

I\, States' Efforts to Regulate Health Care
The Travelers decision is still new enough that there is not a repository of
federal court decisions to give courts and the legal community guidance in how
modern ERISA preemption is to be applied. However, under Travelers, states
have more opportunity than in the past to implement meaningful health care
reform.

This section focuses on some of the state laws that have been

challenged by ERISA.
MANAGED CARE REGULATION:

Generally, unless state laws have a direct economic effect on health
plans, the laws will not be preempted.58The Supreme Court did not overrule its
previous decisions by Travelers, but concluded that the surcharges related to
ERISA plans in a way that Congress never intended to preempt; much like the
"00

tenuous, remote, or peripheral" connection in Shaw v. Delta Airlines. The

"tenuous, remote, or peripheral" narrowing of preemption and recognition of
State's police powers was relied on in a recent lower court decision that has
been granted certiorari by the Supreme Court. In Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v.
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Texas DepY of Ins., 215 F.3d 525 (5'h- Cir. 2000), cerit. granted, 121 S. Ct. 753
(Jan. 8, 2001), the court said that Texas asserted its police power by:
1) Creating a statutory cause of action against managed care entities that
fail to exercise ordinary care for health treatment decisions,
2) Establishing procedures for independent review of health care
decisions and
3) Protecting physicians from imposed indemnity clauses and retaliation
from Health Maintenance Organizations.
The Fifth Circuit then held that only the independent review procedures
.
are preempted by ERISA59 s~gnaling
perhaps a broader role for states in the

regulation of managed care. Thus, Travelers, decided nearly twenty years after
the passage of ERISA, put the brakes on broad preemption of state laws and
opened the door for States, such as Texas, to successfully implement meaningful
health care regulation and reform which specifically addresses state specific
health care issues,
STOP-LOSS INSURANCE:

States have been aggressive in implementing health care regulation and
enforcing patient protection laws by maximizing the reach of the savings
clause.60 However, self-funded plans, even those with significant stop-loss
insurance coverage, continue to be immune from state regulation. Stop-loss
insurance is purchased by an employer to prevent against catastrophic losses,
limit financial impact of health care claims on a business' bottom line and "finetune the amount of risk transferred by the employer to the insurer, resulting in a
plan which is neither fully insured...."61 The majority of circuits hold that the
purchase of stoploss insurance does not exclude a self-funded plan from the
protection of the deemer clause.62This loophole, allowing self-funded plans to
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evade state regulation, has been exploited by insurance companies that develop
"synthetic insurance plans" paying out or "attaching" at levels as low as $5000
per employee. Fourteen states have adopted laws, patterned after the National
Association of lnsurance Commissioners (NAIC) Stop Loss lnsurance Model Act
(Act), that sets a minimum attachment point of $20,000 per plan participant or an
aggregate attachment point of between 110%-120% of total expected annual

claim^.^ (Table 1)
Intended to stop self-funded employers from circumventing state
regulations, laws patterned after the Act have led to opposite court opinions in
the Fourth Circuit and a Kansas state court. The Fourth Circuit held the law was
preempted by ERlSA because it violates the deemer clause. The court focused
on the stated purpose of the state regulation "to protect Maryland residents from
self-funded ERlSA plans and from insurers that sought to deprive citizens of
mandated health benefits."64The court noted that their decision does not effect
Maryland's efforts to regulate stop-loss insurance policies.
The Maryland legislature would have been wise to draft with the language
of Travelers as instruction such that laws with an indirect effect on ERlSA plans
will less likely face preemption. That opinion was clear that a state law could still
have an indirect economic effect on a health plan which "forced an ERlSA plan to
adopt a certain scheme of.. . coverage...or restrict its choice of providers... and
that law would be preempted under 5514"; however, generally indirect laws are
not p r e e m ~ t e dBy
. ~ stating that the purpose was to basically rein in self-insured
plans, the Maryland legislature opened the door to the deemer clause. A better
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course would have been to omit the reference to self-funded plans and stress the
traditional role of the states in regulating insurance under the savings clause and
the McCarran-FergusonAct.
Just as his dissents signaled a change leading up to the Traveler's
decision, Justice Steven's dissent in FMC Corp. v Holliday may also shed light
on the deemer clause. He views the differential treatment between beneficiaries
of self-funded plans and insured plans as "illogical...disparate treatment of
similar situated beneficiaries...[leading one] to expect that reasons for drawing
such an apparently irrational distinction would be discernible in the legislative
history or in the literature discussing the legislation [of ERISA]."~~This
preferential treatment of self-funded plans has ramifications for states' efforts to
provide access to affordable health insurance and mandated benefits for highrisk individuals. ERISA prevents optimal operation of state programs, such as
higkrisk insurance pools or indigent care financing designed to provide health
care coverage for individuals without private insurance, as states are unable to
tax self-funded ERISA plans to the same extent as insured plans.67
However, legislation, unlike the Maryland stop loss legislation, that is not
specifically directed at self-funded plans but rather applied uniformly to all plans
as a state tax, has been upheld as safe from ERISA preemption.68In addition to
the Traveler's decision upholding hospital surcharges on commercial carriers
with low Medicaid enrollment, Wisconsin imposes a tax on carriers, including
stop-loss insurance carriers offering coverage to self-funded plans, which is then
used to fund indigent health care.69 This surcharge legislation, successful at
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escaping ERISA preemption and generic enough to be applied to all health
plans, is an example for states to follow in drafting legislation aimed at
maximizing the quality and funding of health care.
PATIENT PROTECTlON BILLS:

In an effort to improve the quality of health care, and perhaps out of a
frustration with the patchwork approach of federal legislation, states have been
very proactive in passing patient protection legislation. The legislation, enacted in
a majority of the states, typically focuses on three areas: grievance procedures,
consumer protections, and mandated benefits. Grievance procedures center on
internal and external review processes; consumer protections focus on plan
product offerings and design; and mandated benefits require a minimum package
of benefits such as forbidding drive-by deliveries, thus requiring a fortyeight hour
hospital stay following childbirth, and allowing direct access to some specialists
and emergency rooms.70

In addition to state patient protection bills, similar bills have been passed
and are being considered at the federal level leading to concern about the
erosion of state laws by federal legislation. In addressing this potential conflict,
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, has urged Congress to
adopt the language in the Health lnsurance Portability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), an
amendment to ERISA, which establishes the "prevents the application" standard.
This standard says that federal law "shall not be construed to supercede any
provision of State law which establishes, implements, or continues in effect any
standard or requirement solely relating to health insurance carriers except to the
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extent that such standard or requirement prevents the application of a federal
req~irement."~'
It basically says that the federal legislation sets a minimum level
of compliance allowing states to implement matching or better legislation, thus
preventing forum shopping by health plans seeking to evade state protections for
perhaps a leaner federal version.

Part V Conclusion
This paper has focused on ERISA and the unease with which the
legislation has been molded and retrofit into today's dynamic and unsettled
health care environment. It is important to not lose sight of the devastating
problems faced by employees with insolvent benefit plans in the 1970's and the
need for national uniformity in pension plan oversight. However, the current
tension between states and the federal government about the degree to which
states can regulate health care is not resolved and will only escalate. It is
questionable whether this escalation can be prevented or mitigated except by
Congressional amendments to ERISA. Issues such as the need to retool the
savings clause to broaden the reach of the business of insurance and the
disparate remedies available to those under self-funded plans - free from state
regulation but thrust into an environment where federal law has not yet evolvedneed to be addressed. This must be done while considering both state and
federal interests. The one-size fits all approach ERISA took to pension benefits
fails when applied to managed care. The recommendation by the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners of considering the HlPAA "prevents the
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application" standard as setting a minimum or a federal "floor" which states can
meet or exceed should be used as a model for conflicting state and federal
legislation.
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STATES THAT HAVE ENACTED
STOP LOSS INSURANCE MODEL ACT
(Update 1999)

Table 1

-

AK

~

~

.

.

~

%dated LegisJRegs
BULLETIN 97-11 (1997); A.G. Memo 81-133 (1980).

CO

Related LegisJRegs
COL0.REV.STAT. 4 10-16-119 (1994).

Cl'

Related W J R e g s .
BULLETIN PC-7-90 (1990); PC-11-90 (1991).
Related LRgisJRegs.

IA

MD

A.G. Opinion Occ. 3.1990.
Related IqkJRegs.
BULLETIN 1993-12 and 1993-12 Addendum (1993); Bulletin 1997-7
(1997)
ModeVsiilar Legis.
MD ANN. CODE INS. 15126 (1999).

MN

ModeVSiilar Legis.
MlNN. STAT. 95 60A.235 to 60A.236 (1995).

NV

NEV. REV. STAT. 5 689C.940 (1997) (Authority to ado@

NJ

regulation).
Related legismegs.
NJ. REV. STAT. 4 17B:27A-17 (199211996).

OR

Related l&/Regs.
OR. REV.STAT. 9 742.065 (1993)

PA

Related LegisJRegs.
PA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 31 $5 89.471 to 89.474 (1992).

KS

Related IegkJRegs.

TN

Related- 1
S.D.CODIFIED LAWS ANN. 8 58-18B-35 (199511998) (Specifically
prohibits the adoption of a mle affecting atop loss coverage for selffunded employee health programs)
Related IegisJRegs.
BULLETIN dated 7/1/94

WA

Related IegisJRegs.
WASH.REV. CODE ANN. $48.21.015 (1992)

SD

National Association of Insurance Commissioners
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